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Abstract
Although the amount of offered Web services is continuously increasing and the Internet of products
shifts more and more towards an Internet of services there is still a big lack of efficient service
allocation and price determination. Currently, services are mostly charged as flat fees and pay-peruse prices. Albeit static pricing is the most common pricing scheme, dynamic and decentralized
service environment requires highly adaptable mechanism for allocation and price determination. As
the state and context of services change rapidly prices and allocations are continuously fluctuating.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold. Firstly, we introduce three business scenarios for trading
web-based services. Secondly, we analyze design requirements for semi-automated trading of web
services. Thirdly, we propose and define a model approach for trading Internet services. Finally,
using this model, we specify bid extensions for common resource and service description languages.
We evaluate our model by analyzing the introduced concepts and giving examples using the specified
bidding language. We ran a simulation with the implemented prototype showing the appliance and
flexibility of the model.
Keywords: Semantic Model, Service Provisioning, Strategic Bidding, Pricing.

1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a rapid change in Web service technologies, their provisioning and ways
of consumption. Web services are broadly distributed and used by a vast variety of different
consumers with different objectives. On the one hand, there are Web service offerings providing
functionality for social and communication purpose like Flickr1 or del.icio.us2. On the other hand Web
services are used by companies providing valued-added business functionality in all fields of
enterprise activities. Some examples are Xignite3 or Reuters which offer finance services for a large
number of different users. Another example is StrikeIron4 which provides Web services in the field of
CRM, Business Intelligence and data cleansing and processing. Another fast growing field of Web
service application is cloud computing. Companies like Amazon (EC2) or Google offer Web service
access to clouds of computer systems providing computing power for end-users and businesses.
Although the amount of offered Web services is continuously increasing and the Internet of products
shifts more and more towards an Internet of services there is still a lack of efficient service allocation
and price determination. Currently services are mostly charged flat fees and pay-per-use prices. Static
pricing is the most common used pricing scheme. This fact is controversial because especially in
short-living and highly-adaptable environments such as service markets there is a great demand for
mechanisms providing dynamic and fast changing service allocation and pricing.
The so-called Internet of services requires models for automated and economically efficient allocation
of distributed web services. Moreover, to provide and retrieve services one requires common service
ontology – common semantic model of services and their attributes as well as a language to describe
the service offers and bids. Autonomous agents trade the providers’ services on a web service market
and also allocate services for consumers’ applications on demand.
The paper is structured in eight sections. In section 2, we introduce three business scenarios for trading
web-based services. The first scenario describes a situation, where a provider offers a raw service such
as computing power or storage. In the second scenario, an application service is allocated among
service requesters. The third scenario illustrates a situation, where a consumer composes a complex
service from decentralized providers. In section 3, we analyze design requirements for our service
market model approach. Based on the business models and design requirements, section 4 introduces a
model approach for semi-automated bidding. In section 5, we introduce schema extensions for a
bidding language of common resource and service description languages. In section 6 we present
consumer and provider policies for automated bidding. Finally, in section 7 we evaluate our work and
section 8 closes with a conclusion showing open challenges and future work.

2

BUSINESS SCENARIOS

In this section we discuss three use-case scenarios for provisioning and usage of distributed (Web)
services. Figure 1 illustrates the communication between service providers and consumers common to
all three scenarios. A service provider is specifying an offer by defining a service description and
pricing information. On the other side, a consumer requests a service by describing his preferences in
corresponding service and quality parameters with an assigned price and submits it in a bid.
The matching process between offers and bids is provided through a decentralized matching service,
called Service Market (SEM). The objectives of the SEM is (i) to reveal the supply and demand of
computational services and (ii) to efficiently match descriptions of providers’ offers and consumers’
1

http://flickr.com
http://del.icio.us
3
http://xignite.com
4
http://strikeiron.com
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bids with respect to their technical and economic descriptions. The technical description includes input
and output interfaces, service attributes, hardware characteristics and quality parameters. The
economic description consists of attributes like provider’s reservation price, consumer’s willingness to
pay, currency and bid increment. The SEM service will support the matching process through common
market mechanisms, e.g. Double, English, Dutch auction and their derivates (Friedman 1984, Wurman
1999) as well as provide the capability to attach custom market mechanisms.

Figure 1.
2.1

Business use cases for allocation of Internet services.
Scenario 1 - Raw Service Provisioning

Scenario 1 illustrates the provisioning and usage of pure computational services – Raw Services (RS) –
like CPU, storage and bandwidth. The access to such raw service is enabled through a Web service
interface. Prominent examples for such kind of services are Amazon EC25 (Elastic Compute Cloud) or
Sun’s Grid Computing Utility6. A service provider specifies the technical description of the offered
raw service configuration in terms of service attributes for CPU, memory and storage. The offer is
comprised of a charge fee for the service usage in terms of valuation (reservation price) and currency.
Analogously, to execute an application (job), a consumer specifies preferences for the requested CPU,
memory and storage characteristics as well as her willingness to pay in terms of valuation and
currency. Additionally, she specifies input data – executable, data files and required third party
libraries as well as output data formats and target place for the output result.
The SEM Web service is responsible for matching of provider's offers and consumer's bids. The
matching process is separated into two steps. First, the SEM matches the technical description part of
providers' offers and consumers' bid. The second step performs an economic matching of offers and
bids resulting in an allocation of services to consumers’ requests and price determination for the usage.
2.2

Scenario 2 - Application Service Provisioning

Second business scenario describes a situation where a provider offers an application (Web) service
(ApS) e.g. database, image rendering, video processing, data mining, financial and backup services.
Examples in this field are StrikeIron7 which provides Web services in the field of CRM, Business
5
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Intelligence and data cleansing and processing or Reuters8 which offers professional service-based
solutions for financial data processing and analysis. In our scenario, the provider publishes a service
offer with a description of the service in terms of service and quality attributes, input and output
interfaces, data formats as well as pricing information. For the description of application services we
postulate the existence of a core service ontology, which provides taxonomy of basic services
consisting of core service categories and service attributes enriched with semantic information. To
ensure that the offered service meets the promised quality of service, the provider can flexibly allocate
raw services (section 2.1) on demand. The provider price for the offered application service is
calculated by a function depending on the raw service price and the price for the application. In order
to satisfy varying consumer requirements, the application service provider offers her application with
different levels of quality of services and prices in conjunction to her business model (pricing policy).
A consumer will describe her preferences for the required application service using the same service
ontology. The consumer preference includes the requested application service type (e.g. video
rendering service), quality parameters (150f/s etc.) and her willingness to pay for this service.
The matchmaking process of the SEM service is more complex than the first scenario, since it has to
match more service and quality attributes of the offers and bids.
2.3

Scenario 3 -Complex Service Provisioning

Scenario 3 addresses the case, where a consumer requests the composition of interrelated, compatible
(sections 3 and 4) Web services – complex services (CS). An example is the service-oriented business
solution Business-by-design9 by SAP that enables personalized composition of enterprise services.
Services can be offered by one or multiple providers. To enable the composition of Web services, we
assume that each service i) is accessible through standardized input and output interfaces, data
formats and ii) there is a standardized core service ontology (CSO) for service and quality attributes.
Using the CSO, the consumer will specify a set of the requested service types with desired
preferences, their interdependencies in terms of input and output interfaces and data formatted as well
as the valuation for the whole requested service composition. The SEM will validate the specified
service types and will return an allocation only if the services are compatible (section 4).
Based on the CSO, each service provider will offer a well-defined description of her service on the
SM. The provider is incentivized to assure service compatibility among the offered services since she
can only increase the usage and hence the profit of her service.
In this case, the matchmaking mechanism of the SEM has to allocate the requested service bundle or
provide alternative configurations and price offers to the consumer.

3

REQUIREMENTS

Based on the introduced scenarios we derive a set of requirements for semi-automated Web service
provisioning and usage. The derivation is based on related works in the fields of web services
composition and matching (De Roure et al. 2005, Sycara et al. 2003, Roman 2005), policy-based
matching (Berardi et al. 2006, Lamparter and Ankolekar 2007, Milanovic et al. 2003, Stollberg 2005)
and business process description and discovery (Benatallah et al. 2005, Sirin et al. 2002).
• R1 - Service Configurations: This requirement addresses the ability of a service provider and
consumer to specify service configurations at different levels of service quality and price. For
example providers of video processing services need to be able to describe (in sense of input and
output interfaces) different service configurations to provide desired quality level for a requested
price. Moreover, service consumer can require a service with less quality for a lesser price.
8
9
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• R2 - Context-dependent Preferences: Service consumers have different preferences about the
services they are willing to use, location, qualities, etc. a consumers request and choose a service,
taking their own preferences into account, e.g. on service characteristics such as availability,
response time, price etc. Therefore, we need a way to describe requests and preferences for
particular service configurations declaratively with respect to their attributes.
• R3 - Business Policies Appliance: The requirement refers to the ability of consumers and providers
to describe preferences, utilities and prices as a function of service attribute values and to use
declarative rules to model the context-sensitive nature of preferences.
• R4 - Semantic Service Descriptions: Semantic description languages such as OWL-S and WSMO
(Dickinson and Wooldridge 2005; Rao et al. 2004) enable the explicit description of a service and
its attributes. Moreover, semantic technologies enable logical reasoning to bridge different levels of
abstraction that occur when specifying offers and bids.
• R5 - Service composability and compatibility: Semantic (Web) service description technologies
(Haller et al. 2005) enable modularization and composition of distributed services. However,
service composition requires selecting services that are compatible in terms of well defined and
standardized interfaces as well as input and output data formats (Stollberg 2005).
• R6 - Efficient service matching: Requested service configurations should be efficiently matched in
terms of interfaces, input and output data formats (Constantinescu et al. 2004; Pahl 2007) with
offered services in a specified service repository.
Following the requirements, section 4 explicitly defines a model for service offering and requesting.

4

ABSTRACT MODEL

In order to perform the task of service selection, one requires (i) a facility for communicating service
offers and bids, (ii) a policy for matching and ranking offers to bids (Lamparter et al. 2007). The
proposed model illustrates a core approach for description of service offers and bids over service
configurations. For the reader’s convenience we use UML class diagrams to define OWL concepts and
their properties (Brockmans 2004). The core concepts of the model are Configuration, Bid and Policy.

Figure 2.

Abstract Model for service offering and requesting.

The concept Bid represents both - a service offer and a request. Each bid is associated with a service
configuration. The semi-automated bid generation process is supported by pre-configured policies.
Definition 1. Configuration: The concept configuration enables including single or collective service
description documents into the overall bid document. Moreover the bidder can specify preferences
over the requested services using AND, OR and XOR bid constructs.
Definition 2. Service: Let
; … ; | | be the set of all services. A service
is described by
; ;
where represents the set of input elements that are required by the service
the tuple
and
the set of output elements that are returned by the service , respectively. Furthermore, a
with
, where is the Cartesian
service is characterized by a set of feasible configurations
∏
.
In
this context, each
is
product of the discrete service attributes , … , , i.e.
,..,
a vector
,…,
,…,
where
represents the -th value of attribute .
Bidding languages are well-established means within the economic literature (Cerquides 2007, Nisan
2006,Wurman 1999). Based on these works, we explicitly define a model approach for bid generation.

Definition 3. Bid: Assume a set of providers and consumers as well as a set of bids . A service
bid is characterized by a vector
,
, where
represents a service description and
the pricing function that assigns a price to each configuration
of the service .
represents the
We assume that the pricing function is described by an additive function, where
can be used to adjust
pricing function of provider or consumer for attribute . Weight function
the influence of the different attributes on the price.
∑
,…,
,…,
with ∑
1
Definition 4. Simple bid: A simple bid consists of a ( , ) pair, where is the offered or requested
service configuration and is the provider’s reservation price or consumer’s willingness to pay.
A consumer can allocate computational services from more than one provider, e.g. she can obtain a
combination of services – CPU service from Sun and store the data using Amazon’s S3.
),
Definition 5. Combinatorial bid: A combinatorial bid is a bid of the form (
, ,
is a service configuration and
,
,
. In particular OR
where
bids are not capable of representing single item valuations even on two items, moreover it represents
the aggregated willingness to pay for a certain subset. Using AND-bids, the bidder is willing to obtain
all of the specified configurations at once, because CPU without storage is not worth for his
application. The XOR construct implies that the bidder is willing to obtain at most one of these service
configurations for the specified price.
Definition 6: Policy: The policy component is a logic part of the bid generation process. The pricing
policy represents the price building function for a given configuration, the bidding policy is a decision
function, which determines the bidding strategy. With utility policies, providers and consumers can
specify criteria, which have to be maximized by the bidding process.
Definition 7. Service Compatibility: Let be a service of provider with the corresponding input
and output interfaces . Analogously, is a service of provider with the inputs and outputs .
and
. A service compatibility is indicated by
Then, the service is compatible to iff
. The set
contains all services that are compatible with a given service
the notation
|
.
description , i.e.
Definition 8. Technical Matching: Let
be a consumer bid for service
with the corresponding
be a service offer containing the service
with
service description attributes . Respectively, let
technically matches
iff
and
. A technical match is
the attributes . Then,
. The set
contains the service bids that technically match a
indicated by notation
|
.
given consumer bid , i.e.
be a consumer bid for service
with the corresponding
Definition 9. Economic Matching: Let
is a service offer containing the service
with price
. Then, bid
price . Analogously,
iff
and
. An economic match is indicated by notation
economically matches
. The set
contains the service bids that economically match a given consumer bid ,
|
.
i.e.

5

SCHEMA EXTENSION FOR BIDS

In this section we propose a schema extension for bids which is applied but not limited to de-facto
XML-based description languages for job description and submission like JSDL (Anjomshoaa et al.
2005), JDL-GLUE (Laure et al. 2006) and WS-Agreement (Andrieux et al. 2007). WS-Agreement is a
web services protocol for establishing agreement between two parties and therefore more suitable for
negotiations than for auctions. WS-Agreement aims for a more generic level, thus service description
in JSDL and JDL-GLUE can be included as part of it.

We consider the following language extensions for a bid specification:
• Type: bid or offer
• Participant: a unique identification of the market participant
• Price: Represents the provider's, respectively consumer’s price; In case of a deal, it represents the
final price a consumer is paying to the provider; measurement unit is cent
• Duration: Represents the requested computational time measured in milliseconds
• TimeToComplete: represents information about a tentative or agreed completion time which can be
reported from the provider. Optional component depending on the market mechanism
• Currency: Each valuation is associated with a currency
• TimeValid: The time in milliseconds a bid is valid. This extension is optional and depends on the
used market mechanism (e.g. a continuous double auction)
• Configuration: This element provides the ability to bid for single or combination of service
configurations specified with XOR, OR and AND bid constructs.
We propose following schema extensions for JSDL, JDL-GLUE and WS-Agreement:
:
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POLICIES FOR AUTOMATED BIDDING

Within this section, we present policies for the automated bid generation process. With pricing policies
providers and consumers specify how the price for a given service configuration and quality is
calculated. Utility policies specify the utility maximization functions. The bidding policy determines
the bidding strategy i.e. the rules how, what and until when to bid in respect to the market mechanism.
6.1

Pricing and Utility Policies

In the following pricing function machinePrice, a raw service (RS) or application service (ApS) price
is calculated based on the service utilization – a common metric for pricing of computational resources
(Mendelson et al. 1985), the service’s reservation price and an increment. The machine price is
dynamically adjusted based on pre-configured increments and utilization bounds
(30-50%, 5070% etc.). Following code snippet represents the pricing policy in JESS (Friedman-Hill et al. 2003):
?
0

?

?

?
? 1
? 2

?
?

?
? 1

? 3

?
?

? 1? 2? 3? 1? 2? 3
?
? 2
?
? 3
?

0
? 1
? 2

The consumer’s pricing policy buyerPrice returns a bid price based on the consumer’s application
valuation and the actual releaseDate. We assume that RS or ApS are mostly utilized between 7am and
8pm, so the consumer’s valuation may depend on the urgency of her application. This pricing policy
0; 24 during which the price is (negative) incremented by :
defines time-periods ,
?
?

0
?
?

?

?
?
? 1
? 2

?
?

? 1 ? 2 ? 3 ? 4 ? 1 ? 2? 3
? 1
? 2
? 3

?
?
?

0
? 1
? 2

? 3

We assume that the objective of a service provider is to maximize the user’s satisfaction as well as her
profit. A simple utility function which provides fair price-based scheduling based on the consumer's
∑
valuation for a requested processing time is presented by Heydenreich et al.:
Using this utility policy, the allocated jobs are prioritized in the provider's machine queue according to
the ratio of consumer's valuation and requested processing time. A consumer is willing to execute her
application (job) using a provider service. Ideally the job is allocated to a service, so e.g. the
completion time (or some other objective) is minimized. Self-interested consumers, however, will be
interested in minimizing their own completion time and payments based on their application’s
valuation v. The following consumer's policy (Heydenreich et al. 2006) implements this objective:
∑
,
,
6.2

Bidding Policies

In the literature (Phelps 2007, Tenorio 1999) bidding strategies are commonly classified in:
• Truth-Telling Strategy: The truth-telling strategy places a bid equal to the provider’s or consumer’s
valuation. Although it is a simple strategy, truth-telling is of fundamental importance, since in
incentive-compatible mechanisms, this strategy guarantees to obtain the optimal pay-off for
consumers no matter what strategies are adopted by the others. In budget-balanced double-auction
mechanisms, on the other hand, this strategy is not dominant.
• Equilibrium-Price Strategy: Describes the case when consumers or providers hypothetically
knowing the true equilibrium price of a service, so they can coordinate high efficiency outcomes in
a wide variety of mechanisms regardless of incentive-compatibility properties.

• Reinforcement-learning Strategies: These strategies rely on feedback from interacting with the
mechanism and can be used in any auction-based mechanism with scarce or no access of public
market data. A prominent example is the Q-learning algorithm. To define a bidding strategy, the
algorithm requires a definition of states, the admissible actions in each state, the returned reward in
each state as well as the policy for changing the state and selecting the best action. A commonly
used greedy policy is to select the action that yields the highest Q-value for a given state.

7

EVALUATION

The section starts with analysis of the proposed model for automated service provisioning and usage
and gives an example of the specified bidding language. Finally, it presents simulation results of the
implemented prototype.
7.1

Technical analysis

In section 4 we introduced a core model for trading Internet services. Using policies, a provider or
consumer is able to configure price, utility functions and bidding strategies for the automated service
provisioning and usage (R3). For the concept configuration we assume the usage of standardized
service ontology and require the id of the described service as a part of the bid document. Using the
concept simple bid a consumer or provider is able to specify a price for a raw service (scenario 1) or
application service (scenario 2) configuration, whereas the usage of logical operators XOR, AND or
OR enables the specification of more complex service configurations (scenario 3).
In the following example we demonstrate the usage of the bidding language proposed in section 5 in
respond to requirements R1and R2. Suppose a consumer is requesting a complex service for the
duration of 2 hours, which can be covered either by configurations
or { AND }, each of them
achieving a similar outcome. The maximum consumer’s price for one of them amounts 1.8 EUR:
:

:
:
:
:

1.80 / :
7200000 / :
1000000 / :
/ :
" 3" /

/

/

/

" 1" /
/

" 2"/

:

This proposed bidding language extension (section 5) enables the specification of single price for
single service configuration, but also for combination of configurations. Based on specified price the
market mechanism should find a suitable service allocation and respectively calculate the payments.
The bid and policy components are motivated by the fact that computational, data mining and financial
services are often charged for a fee and the increasing demand and supply requires an automated
approach for providing and matching of Web services. This is especially essential for companies
providing large-scale computational services, but also “large-scale” applications e.g. video-processing,
computer aided design and simulations. Using the model and the bidding language, an autonomous
agent can be configured with policies and service configurations in order to trade their services
automatically on the service market. On the other side such agents can also be used in a similar way by
customers who use applications regularly. Application providers using raw services on demand or
reusing existing services in order to minimize development costs and time can also benefit from using
autonomous agents. This model approach applied to raw services is evaluated in the following section.
7.2

Simulation

The implemented prototype (Figure 3) consists of two types of implemented agents – Job (consumer)
agent and machine (provider) agent. Each machine agents uses the same pre-configured pricing policy
and each job-agent the same utility policy (section 6), which are loaded into the rule-engine JESS. The
agents are adopting the truth-telling bidding strategy for reporting the job requirements and payments.

Figurre 3.

A prototype im
mplementatiion of the speecified modell.

Each job and macchine agent submits
s
a bidd in form off extended JS
SDL file (secction 5) for a raw servicee
(scennario 1). The service markket (SEM) component
c
im
mplements tw
wo allocationn mechanism
ms – FIFO ass
variannt of a technnical scheduller and a deccentralized on
nline scheduuling mechannism (DLGM
M), presentedd
in Heeydenreich et
e al. 2006. The
T DLGM mechanism aims to minnimize the tootal weighted
d completionn
time ∑
acrosss all jobs, hence
h
maxim
mizing their utility.
u
Basedd on the assuumptions off DLGM, wee
m
aree homogeneeous and theeir CPU, stoorage and OS
O technicall
consiider that thee provided machines
descrription alwayys match the consumer reequirements. DLGM com
mprises follow
wing three stteps:
• Sttep 1 – Job submission:: on a release date
of
o job a joob-agent subbmits a bid to the SEM
M
reequesting a computationa
c
al service forr the duration and waiiting costs . The waitin
ng costs of a
joob express thee costs for waiting
w
one addditional tim
me unit in thee machine’s w
waiting queu
ue. The SEM
M
inn the case of DLGM
D
forw
wards the requuest to all reg
gistered macchines
.
• Sttep 2 – Reall-time planniing: Based on
o the receiv
ved information, the macchines perforrm real-timee
pllanning basedd on a local scheduling policy
p
– if jo
ob j has a higgher priority value than
,
thhen j is schedduled before job
j k in the waiting
w
queu
ue. Dependinng on the currrent local waaiting queue,,
thhe machine i reports a tenntative (ex-aante reported
d) completionn time andd payment to the agentt
off job (Heyddenreich et al.
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• Sttep 3 – Macchine selectioon: Upon recceiving inforrmation about its tentatiive completion time andd
reequired paym
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ng decision to queue att certain maachine , andd
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In ordder to evaluaate the two mechanisms
m
within the prototype,
p
wee ran six setttings (Table 1), whereass
each setting compprised 5 machines agentss. Each settin
ng was run inn 25 rounds w
with the duraation of 10000
time units. To increase
i
the competitionn in the maarket, acrosss the coursee of these settings, wee
succeessively increeased the Pooisson-based arrival rate of jobs from
m
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Setting
Arrivaal time of thhe Poisson-bassed release daates
Actuaal number of jobs
Durattion
Weighhting costs

Tablee 1.

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5
5

S6

.2
.5
.6
.7
.8
1
208
2
440
559
6686
795
5
1050
Normal
N
distribuution with meean 9 and variaance 3
Normal
N
distribuution with meean 9 and variaance 3

S
Simulation
seettings

The results
r
of thee simulationss are summarrized in Tablle 2. The utilization beinng defined ass the numberr
of jobbs where thhe mechanism
m is busy diivided by th
he total num
mber of time slots repressents a goodd
metriic for expresssing the leveel of competiition. As all two
t mechaniisms do not iimpose pricee bounds likee
job budgets,
b
utilizzation is ideentical for alll three mech
hanisms. For an arrival raate of
0.2 with a job
b
sequeence of 208 jobs,
j
the macchines are onnly used 38 % of the tim
me. When the size of the job sequencee
increaases to 559 jobs, the utiilization ratee grows up to
t 77 %, andd the machinnes are fully
y utilized forr
settinngs with morre than 700 jobs.
j
When the
t competittion is low, technical
t
schhedulers achiieve as goodd
welfaare (i.e. totall weighted completion
c
t
time)
as DLG
GM does. However,
H
witth increasing
g utilization,,
technnical schedullers are starrting to perfo
form worse than
t
market mechanism
ms. When co
ompetition iss
extrem
mely high, FIFO
F
generattes about 13 % higher overall waitingg costs than D
DLGM.

Metric
Utilization
Aggregated
waiting cost
Positive
Compensations
Lateness
[Time periods]

Table 2.

Mechanism\Setting
All mechanisms
FIFO
DLGM
FIFO
DLGM
FIFO
DLGM

S1
38%
-916K
-916K
0%
1%
0
.002

S2
77%
-1,993K
-2,001K
0%
7%
0
.073

S3
91%
-2,676K
-2,650K
0%
16%
0
1.13

S4
100%
-3,633K
-3,340K
0%
18%
0
8.72

S5
100%
-5,046K
-4,370K
0%
23%
0
20.73

S6
100%
-8,784K
-7,042K
0%
34%
0
58.99

Simulation results – FIFO vs. DLGM

This result is rather straightforward, as technical schedulers do not account for the relative urgency of
jobs, specified indirectly with the application valuation. The lateness metric measures the time
difference between ex-post and tentative completion time.
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CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

In this paper we introduce three business scenarios for trading Web services, section 2. Based on
these, section 3, we derive design requirements for semi-automated trading. Section 4 present and
explicitly defines a core model for trading Internet services. Using the model, in section 5 we specify
bid extensions for common resource and service description languages as well as present policies for
automated bidding, section 6. We evaluate our model, first, by analyzing the introduced concepts and
giving an example for a bid specification using the specified extensions. Secondly, we show
simulation results from the implemented prototype showing the appliance and flexibility of the model.
Since there is no known ontology, which explicitly defines and categorize service and quality
attributes like required in scenarios two and three (R5), the next steps will include the design and
development of such simple core service ontology. For the definition of the core concepts and
attributes we will employ web service repositories like seekda (www.seekda.com) and QWS
(www.uoguelph.ca/~qmahmoud/qws). Moreover, to evaluate the efficiency and applicability of an
economic and technical matching of Web services (R5, R6) we are elaborating algorithms validating
the composability and compatibility of service descriptions as well as suitable matching algorithms, in
form of market mechanism, for allocating bids and offers of application and complex services.
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